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Abstract
The spread of infectious disease via commercial airliner travel is a significant and realistic threat. To shed some light on the
feasibility of detecting airborne pathogens, a sensor integration study has been conducted and computational
investigations of contaminant transport in an aircraft cabin have been performed. Our study took into consideration
sensor sensitivity as well as the time-to-answer, size, weight and the power of best available commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
devices. We conducted computational fluid dynamics simulations to investigate three types of scenarios: (1) nominal
breathing (up to 20 breaths per minute) and coughing (20 times per hour); (2) nominal breathing and sneezing (4 times per
hour); and (3) nominal breathing only. Each scenario was implemented with one or seven infectious passengers expelling air
and sneezes or coughs at the stated frequencies. Scenario 2 was implemented with two additional cases in which one
infectious passenger expelled 20 and 50 sneezes per hour, respectively. All computations were based on 90 minutes of
sampling using specifications from a COTS aerosol collector and biosensor. Only biosensors that could provide an answer in
under 20 minutes without any manual preparation steps were included. The principal finding was that the steady-state
bacteria concentrations in aircraft would be high enough to be detected in the case where seven infectious passengers are
exhaling under scenarios 1 and 2 and where one infectious passenger is actively exhaling in scenario 2. Breathing alone
failed to generate sufficient bacterial particles for detection, and none of the scenarios generated sufficient viral particles for
detection to be feasible. These results suggest that more sensitive sensors than the COTS devices currently available and/or
sampling of individual passengers would be needed for the detection of bacteria and viruses in aircraft.
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Introduction
The potential for international airline passengers to transport
infectious diseases into the United States is a serious concern. In
2003, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus was
largely spread by air travelers and became a global epidemic; at
least 18 countries on 5 continents were affected, resulting in over
8,000 cases and 774 fatalities [1]. One conservative estimate of the
economic damage to Asian countries was calculated as $11 billion
[2]. Influenza viruses that can be spread by air travelers have the
potential to cause far greater harm [3,4,5]. Deliberate infection of
passengers by terrorists is also a possible threat [6]. A potentially
powerful tool to mitigate disease threats would be rapid and
accurate detection of a variety of airborne infectious pathogens
onboard commercial aircraft before passengers and crew deplane.
We are interested in evaluating the feasibility of a rapid, reliable
and miniature biosensor system that could be deployed onboard
commercial aircraft. An appropriate biosensor would need to have
a high probability of detection (PD.0.9) and a low probability of
‘‘false alarms’’ (i.e., PFA,10
26); to be capable of detecting
airborne pathogens rapidly (in ,3 hours for overseas international
flights, in ,1 hour for continental international flights) at non-
lethal concentrations; to use minimal consumables so as to
minimize system maintenance; to be relatively inexpensive to
produce in large volumes; to be energy efficient, compact and
lightweight (ideally each individual sensor would be cell phone-
sized); and to be rugged enough to remain operable for at least
twice the average working life of typical commercial aircraft.
Based on these requirements, we apply a systems engineering
approach by first establishing acceptable Type I (false positive) and
Type II (false negative) error rates. To establish a Type I error
rate, we consider that approximately 650,000 flights landed in the
United States in 2009, suggesting that a sensor system with a PFA
of 10
26 would result in no more than one false alarm per year in
the US (see Figure 1). Type II error rates should be based on the
number of organisms commonly found in a commercial aircraft
cabin today that would give rise to false negatives (e.g.,
contaminants in the air could cause one or more biosensing
modalities to be impaired even in the presence of the pathogen)
relative to the sensor’s detection threshold. To establish a Type II
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e14520error rate, we surveyed the literature and compiled microbial
information from studies onboard aircraft (refer to Appendix of
[3]). However, the granularity of the available data is insufficient
to derive an acceptable Type II error rate.
Our initial focus is to evaluate the feasibility of installing a
biosensor system on overseas international flights (e.g., from
China). We therefore analyzed the range of flight durations into a
major U.S. international airport, the San Francisco International
Airport (SFO) in 2009. As shown in Figure 2, flight durations from
several international locations to SFO range from ,1.5 to
,13.5 hours. In particular, many flights from Canada to the
United States with durations as short as 1.5 hours may have
originated in China (i.e., Vancouver – ,2504 flights per year;
Toronto – ,1368 flights per year). We therefore designed model
scenarios around a minimum aerosol sampling duration of
1.5 hours.
To understand contaminant transport and airflow patterns
inside an aircraft cabin, prior researchers have used computational
fluid dynamics (CFD) models to predict airflows with [7] and
without [8,9] simulated passengers. Some of these studies were
based on measurements using 3D ultrasonic anemometers [10]
and particle image velocimetry systems [11]. Measurements of
airflow were conducted using mock airliner cabins with
[10,12,13,14,15,16,17] and without [18] simulated passengers
(e.g., heated manikins or heaters). Chemical contaminants such as
SF6 tracer gas and bio-simulant particles such as mono-dispersed
(0.7 micron) di-ethyl-hexyl-sebacat [DEHS] have been modeled
using the Reynolds averaged Navier-Stokes equations based on the
Renormalized Group (RNG) k–e turbulence model [12,17,19]. In
particular, to determine optimal sensor placement in a mock wide-
body aircraft cabin section, CFD simulations have been used to
model different chemical release conditions (continuous or discrete
doses) and release rates (10
27,1 0
26,o r1 0
25 m
3/s [12,19]). These
studies reported that the optimal sensor placement in a wide-body
airliner cabin would be in the middle of the ceiling for simulated
sensor sensitivity ranging from 0.01 parts per million (ppm) to
10 ppm [12,19]. Although these previous studies are insightful and
valuable, they do not directly address whether sufficient human
exhalations are released into the aircraft cabin for onboard
biosensors to detect the presence of harmful particles. Earlier work
also failed to correlate tracer gas concentration with the number of
viral particles per cubic meter of cabin air or infectivity.
Figure 1. International Airline Arrivals into the United States, 2009. Source: Analysis of T-100 International Segment data, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.g001
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breathing, coughing and sneezing. Since infectious airborne
particles are typically under 20 microns [4], here we restrict our
simulation and analysis to expellants with diameters under 20
microns. To establish a medically relevant cough scenario, we
surveyed studies that measured cough frequencies from patients
with respiratory conditions for up to 24 continuous hours. These
results are summarized in Table S1 for asthma [20,21], chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease [22,23,24], chronic cough
[25,26,27,28], cystic fybrosis [29], idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis
[30], primary ciliary dyskinesia [31], pulmonary tuberculosis [23],
and pneumonia [23]. Based on these results, we simulate 20
coughs per hour as a representative cough frequency in infected
passengers. To establish a plausible sneeze scenario, we assume
that a typical infectious passenger can sneeze from 4 to 50 times
per hour, where the highest sneeze frequency approaches that of a
‘‘super spreader’’ — a term that can refer to persons with ‘‘high
values of cough and/or sneeze frequency, elevated pathogen
concentration in respiratory fluid, and/or increased respirable
aerosol volume per expiratory event such that their pathogen
emission rate is much higher than average’’ [32]. In addition to
particles expelled during coughing and sneezing, particles exhaled
during regular breathing were also accounted in each scenario. To
establish a plausible breathing scenario, the distribution and
concentration of particles exhaled during breathing were taken
from studies that employed aerodynamic particle sizers [33],
combined with data previously reported in the literature (see
Methods for details). Collectively, we simulated three types of
scenarios: (1) breathing and coughing, (2) breathing and sneezing,
and (3) inhaling only through the nose and exhaling only from the
mouth.
Results
To verify that the temperature and velocity gradients computed
by our CFD model are consistent with previous work by Chen et al.
[17], we compared the velocity profiles from a 4’’ mesh and found
good agreement. As shown in Figure 3, the airflow occurs
primarily transverse to the main axis of the cabin. This is in part
due to the absence of simulated passenger traffic in the aisle.
Furthermore, the CFD aircraft cabin flow fields presented here are
consistent with results presented by independent investigators [17]
and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [34].
In our CFD simulations, we specified some number of infected
passengers whom we considered to be contaminant producers
(Figure 4, second-to-last row, shown in orange). The locations of
the mouths of these passengers are the initial positions of simulated
exhaled particles. To visualize the transverse extent of exhalant
trajectories during a breathing-and-coughing scenario, we show
streamlines originating at these positions that represent the flow of
particles across the cabin (Figure 4, bottom). Each of the infected
passengers released the same amount of contaminant within each
case simulated.
To assess the feasibility of onboard bio-detection equipment for
each tested scenario, the particles exhaled from each infected
passenger were simulated under steady-state conditions (equilib-
rium, well-mixed) and the airborne particles concentrations were
computed based on their diameter size using specifications from
COTS aerosol collectors. For purposes of classification, we refer to
particles that are between 1 and 20 microns in diameter as
‘‘bacterial’’ and particles less than 1 micron as ‘‘viral’’. We then
compared the accumulated biomass to the limit of detection (LoD)
of COTS biosensors. Case A was simulated with seven infected
passengers, each breathing 20 times a minute across all scenarios,
where scenario 1 simulates breathing and coughing, scenario 2
simulates breathing and sneezing, and scenario 3 simulates
breathing only. Cough and sneeze rates were set to 20 and 4
exhalation events per hour, respectively. The steady-state masses
in case A were computed to be 3.43610
29 kg, 5.12610
29 kg, and
3.07610
29 kg for scenarios 1, 2, and 3, respectively (refer to
Table 1, Case A, row a). These masses correspond to
approximately 6610
6 bacterial and 6610
6 viral particles in
Figure 2. 2009 Mean Flight Times to the San Francisco International Airport (SFO). Source: Analysis of T-100 International Segment data,
Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.g002
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7 bacterial and over 8610
3 viral particles
in scenario 2, and over 1.0610
5 bacterial and over 1.7610
5 viral
particles in scenario 3 (see Table 1, Case A, row b).
To obtain the biological particles per cubic meter of cabin
space, we applied two factors. First, the total number of particles at
steady-state (row b) was divided by the total volume of air in the
four-row aircraft cabin section, which was 26.9 m
3. Second, the
bacterial particles were multiplied by a viable fraction of 4.7610
24
while viral particles were multiplied by an estimated viable fraction
of 5.9610
25 to obtain biological particle counts per cubic meter,
respectively (see Table 1, Case A, row c) [35]. To estimate the
number of collectable viable particles as a function of particle size
(i.e., bacterial versus viral), the values in row c were multiplied by
aerosol collector efficiencies which account for the fraction of
particles collected with respect to the total number of particles
present. Specifically, based on values from a commercially
available collector (OMNI 3000, Kansas City, MO), we applied
collector efficiencies of 0.91 and 0.357 for the bacterial and viral
particles, respectively [36]. Finally, the total cumulative numbers
of collectable viable biological particles in a 90-minute continuous
sampling interval were calculated based on a typical collector flow
rate (i.e., 0.3 m
3 per minute) (see Table 1, Case A, row e). Because
the viability coefficients germane to estimating bacterial and viral
particle counts were based on limited estimates from a single study
[35], we included the total number of collectible particles in
Table 1, Case A, row f as an upper bound on detection. The
values in Table 1, Case A, row f were not used in this analysis
because it is highly unlikely that a person would exhale 100%
infectious bacteria or virus even in states of high bacterial or viral
shedding.
To determine the feasibility of using onboard biosensors to
detect the presence of airborne particles, the numbers of
collectable viable particles in 90 minutes (Table 1, Case A, row
e) from all cases were compared with the LoD in mature,
commercially available biosensors [37]. Commercial biosensors
that rely on nucleic acid-based polymerase-chain reaction (PCR)
amplification are known to have limits of detection of less than 10
copies, and generally provide a time-to-answer in 60 minutes.
However, because manual sample preparation is outside the scope
of this analysis and antibody-based biosensor systems can generally
provide a time-to-answer in under 20 minutes, we only considered
non-PCR biosensor systems here. The typical LoD for a COTS
antibody-based biosensor system ranges from 10
3–10
4 organisms
per test (manufacturers typically refer to bacterial organisms as
colony-forming units and viral organisms as plaque forming units)
[37]. Therefore, based on these analyses, COTS collectors and
biosensors would be sufficiently sensitive to detect bacterial targets
in a 90-minute sampling interval for only scenarios 1 (breathing
and coughing) and 2 (breathing and sneezing). Scenario 3
(breathing only) generated fewer than 10
3 bacterial particles.
Further, none of the scenarios generated sufficient viral particles
for detection to be feasible. Note, however, that there are
significant limitations and unknowns involved in quantifying viral
particles without direct data gathered from field tests (see
Discussion).
To examine the sensitivity of our analysis, we decreased the
number of infectious passengers from seven to one in case B for
scenarios 1 though 3. All other input parameters were identical to
case A. The numbers of collectable viable particles in 90 minutes
(Table 1, Case B, row e) from all cases were compared with 10
3
organisms per test. In contrast to case A, only scenario 2 (breathing
and sneezing) generated sufficient numbers of bacterial particles
(i.e., more than 10
3) for onboard detection to be feasible. The
remainder of case B simulation results were well beneath the 10
3
organisms per test, suggesting that onboard detection would not be
feasible.
Figure 3. 4’’ Mesh Velocity Contour.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.g003
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2. Case C was simulated based on one infected person breathing
up to 20 times a minute and sneezing 20 times per hour, while case
D was simulated based on one super spreader breathing up to 20
times a minute and sneezing 50 times per hour (see Methods for
details). In both cases C and D, we found that over 600 bacterial
particles would be detected in a 90- minute sampling interval
(Table 1, Case C and D, row e), while no more than one viral
particle would be detected. Taken together, these estimates suggest
that onboard detection would not be feasible for bacterial- or viral-
particles in cases C and D.
To confirm that equilibrium conditions are indeed reached
early during a flight, we calculated the time to reach steady state.
Note, however, that transient characteristics are primarily
governed by airflow. The following concentration rates are
provided for completeness, not to imply that the equilibrium time
depends upon the rate of contaminant introduction. First, we used
known data to calculate the approximate expellant volume of
particles under 20 microns for one cough (,2.04610
27ml), one
sneeze (,5.27610
25ml), and one breath (1.24610
28ml). (See
Methods for details.) We also modeled seven passengers who either
cough 20 times per hour in scenario 1, sneeze 4 times per hour in
scenario 2, or simply breathe 20 times per hour in scenario 3. This
allowed us to calculate total per-passenger particle-generation
rates (in kg per second) of 4.67610
212, 7.04610
212, and
4.15610
212, respectively (Table 2). Taking the ratio of the steady
state concentrations for scenarios 1 through 3 (Table 1, Case A [kg
per cabin volume]: 3.43610
29, 5.12610
29, 3.07610
29) to the
per-passenger particle-generation rate, we arrived at approxi-
mately 12 minutes to reach steady state for scenarios 1 through 3.
Twelve minutes is well within a typical flight time and under the
90-minute sampling time interval.
Due to the temporal characteristics associated with sneezing and
coughing, a time history study is required to understand the
movements of contaminant particles released during these
expiratory events (Figure 5). In the transient case presented here,
each passenger sneezes once and the fluid expelled at each seat
location was tracked with regard to the time to transport the
contaminant to the outlet vents. The resultant history of the
contaminant in the cabin is computed in terms of contaminant
Figure 4. Infected Passenger Schematic. Seat Position from Left to Right: LK FED BA. Contaminant Streamlines Shown for Scenario 1 Breathing
and Coughing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.g004
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The contaminant concentration shown in Figure 5A represents the
contaminant mass divided by the cabin volume. As a result, these
values are not the measure of local values of contamination at each
seat position in the cabin, some of which would show higher
contaminant concentrations. Rather, the numbers represent
average concentrations across each four-row cabin section
illustrated in Figure 4.
The contaminant mass flow rate at the outlet vent is shown in
Figure 5B. We observe that contaminants emitted from window
seat positions (Figure 4, seats L and A) enter the outlet ventilation
much faster than those emitted from other seats. It is possible that
the flow from the window seats may be too transient for a ceiling-
mounted collector above the central seats to aggregate enough
particles to achieve reliable identification from those passenger
seated in L or A. To mitigate this relatively low sampling rate, the
collector may require a high inflow rate. Further, this suggests that
a collector’s effectiveness may increase when the collector is placed
at the outlet vent near the window seat position. This may not be
the most appropriate sensor location for collecting non-window-
seat emissions, because the contaminant concentration becomes
substantially diluted by the time it reaches the outlet, as shown by
the second y-axis in Figure 5B.
Overall, the findings for each of these three scenarios were
similar and consistent with the findings of Chen’s laboratory
[12,17]. The general air flow characteristics are two big vortices
caused by the ventilation system that generates a recirculation
swirl on each side of the aircraft. Specifically, particle emissions
from the two window seat passengers (Figure 4, seats L and A)
were the least circulated contaminants within the cabin (see
Table 1. Estimates of collectable biological particles.
Scenarios: (1) Breathing & Coughing (2) Breathing & Sneezing (3) Breathing Only
Bacterial Viral Bacterial Viral Bacterial Viral
Case A. Seven Super spreader
a) Accumulated mass at steady state (kg) 3.43610
29 5.12610
29 3.07610
29
b) Total particles at steady state 6.469610
6 6.570610
6 1.082610
7 8,589 1.088610
5 1.782610
5
c) Biological particles per m
3 113.02 14.41 189 ,1 1.9 0.39
d) No. of collectable biological particles per m
3 102.66 5.14 172 ,1 1.7 0.14
e) No. of collectable viable particles in 90
minutes at 0.3 m
3/min
2,771.79 138.69 4,635 ,1 46.62 3.76
f) No. of collectable particles in 90 minutes
at 0.3 m
3/min
5.897610
6 2.351610
6 9.862610
6 3,073 9.919610
4 6.375610
4
Case B. One Super spreader
a) Accumulated mass at steady state (kg) 7.97610
210 1.15610
29 6.98610
210
b) Total particles at steady state 1.502610
6 1.525610
6 2.425610
6 1,925 2.479610
4 4.059610
4
c) Biological particles per m
3 26.24 3.35 42 ,1 0.43 0.09
d) No. of collectable biological particles per m
3 23.84 1.19 38 ,1 0.39 0.03
e) No. of collectable viable particles in 90
minutes at 0.3 m
3/min
643.55 32.20 1039 ,1 10.62 0.86
f) No. of collectable particles in 90 minutes
at 0.3 m
3/min
1.369610
6 5.458610
5 2.210610
6 689 2.260610
4 1.452610
4
Case C. One Super spreader
a) Accumulated mass at steady state (kg) 3.45610
29
b) Total particles at steady state 1.525610
6 1,210
c) Biological particles per m
3 27 ,1
d) No. of collectable biological particles per m
3 24 ,1
e) No. of collectable viable particles in 90
minutes at 0.3 m
3/min
653 ,1
f) No. of collectable particles in 90 minutes
at 0.3 m
3/min
1.390610
6 433
Case D. One Super spreader
a) Accumulated mass at steady state (kg) 8.52610
29
b) Total particles at steady state 1.571610
6 1,247
c) Biological particles per m
3 27 ,1
d) No. of collectable biological particles per m
3 24 ,1
e) No. of collectable viable particles in 90
minutes at 0.3 m
3/min
673 ,1
f) No. of collectable particles in 90 minutes
at 0.3 m
3/min
1.432610
6 446
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.t001
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contrast, particles emitted by the passengers seated at the center or
aisle seats lingered in the cabin and were not transported as
effectively to the outlet vent compared to particles that originated
from the window seats (see Figure 5B). The particles emitted from
the aisle seat passengers near the windows (seats B and K) tend to
linger longer because it enters the recirculation zone at a location
where the air is pushing the particles away from the vents. The
particles emitted from the aisle passengers in the center seats (seats
D and F) enter the recirculation zone at a location where it is
driven towards the vents. These results should not be applied
broadly to all wide-body aircraft because the simulations were
based on a representative Boeing 767 aircraft cabin.
Discussion
Three scenarios of infectious ‘‘super spreader’’ passengers were
investigated, consisting of states of extreme coughing, extreme
sneezing, and regular breathing. Our principal finding was that the
steady-state bacteria concentrations in aircraft would be high
enough to be detected in the case where seven infectious passengers
are exhaling under scenarios 1 (breathing and coughing) and 2
(breathing and sneezing), and where one infectious passenger is
actively exhaling in scenario 2. Breathing alone failed to generate
sufficient bacterial particles for detection, and none of the scenarios
generated sufficient viral particles for viral detection to be feasible.
This is consistent with a recent study by Fabian et al. who found
that only 33% of infected persons exhale detectable viral RNA.
Fabian et al. sampled directly from a breathing apparatus with
Teflon filters and identified the collected particles by RNA
extraction [38]. Unlike this direct sampling method, the aircraft
cabin is designed for rapid dilution by turning over the air volume
approximately 20 times per hour. Taken together, these findings
provide further support for the view that it is difficult to collect and
detect viral particles directly from cabin air using autonomous
collector and biosensor systems.
It is important to realize that infectious particles can be emitted
during regular breathing. Particles released during regular
breathing are predominantly under 1 micron in diameter [38],
small enough to enter the human alveolar region and upper
respiratory tract. Some subjects can exhale more contaminant
particles from breathing than from coughing: consider that the
average person breathes 20 times a minute and each breath may
contain 0.5 liters of air. Although one cough may release up to
3.56 liters of air, the typical cough frequency of a sick person is
usually less than 50 times per hour. The rate of exhalation for
breathing is therefore significantly higher for breathing than for
coughing. In this study, we assumed that exhaling passengers are
not covering their mouths during coughing and sneezing;
however, airline passengers are likely to cough or sneeze into
their hands or elbows, though most do not cover their mouths
when breathing. This differential in mitigating behaviors by
passengers enhances the possibility of asymptomatic airborne
transmission. Interestingly, observational studies conducted on the
novel H1N1 virus reported a wide range of asymptomatic
infection rates: from ,10% among households in Germany and
Canada [39,40] to over 90% in India [41]. For influenza virus
alone, multiple modes of transmission have been hypothesized
[42,43], and there is limited information on viral shedding from
asymptomatic persons. However, we believe that airway trans-
mission via regular breathing cannot be ruled out as a putative
transmission pathway for communicable respiratory diseases.
Further investigation of this pathway is especially critical given
recent data on the number of particles exhaled during normal
breathing [44].
Other studies suggest different values for the amount of bacteria
and viruses produced by sneezing and breathing. A related study
on staphylococcus aureus dispersion (11 subjects) from sneezes
reported 2.83 and 3.24 colony-forming units (CFU) per cubic
meter per minute of S. aureus and coagulase-negative staphylococ-
ci, respectively [45]. If we assume that 6 CFU represent 6 particles
in the 2–4 micron range based on data from the Duguid sneeze
study [35], and that one sneeze approximates 3.56 liters of air in
one second, then this would suggest that the viable fraction of
infectious bacteria per sneeze is 8.1610
-6. This is less than the
viable fractions used to compute the total number of collectable
viable particles in Table 1, row e. Another study of influenza (13
symptomatic subjects) reported that one person generated up to 20
influenza particles per minute during breathing [38]. The same
study reported 87% of exhaled particles were ,1 micron with
particle counts ranging from 61–3,848 and 5–2,756 per liter of air
for particle sizes ranging from 0.3–0.5 and 0.5–1 microns,
respectively. So in one minute, if a person breathed at a rate of
10 liters per minute, a possible range of 660 to 66,040 particles
under 1 micron could be generated, giving rise to influenza-
containing particle fractions ranging from 0.03 to 0.0003. The
Fabian study did not address the viability of influenza particles;
Table 2. Expiratory parameters per passenger.
Scenarios (case) Expiratory Description Concentration (kg/m
3)
{
Average Expellants
(kg/s)
1
Average Volume
Exhaled (L/s)
1 (A&B) Breathing and Coughing –
,20 breaths per minute and 20 coughs per hour
2.51610
28 4.67610
212 0.186
2 (A&B) Breathing and Sneezing – ,20 breaths per minute
and 4 sneezes per hour
4.13610
28 7.04610
212 0.171
3 (A&B) Breathing Only –
20 breaths per minute
2.49610
28 4.15610
212 0.167
2 (C) Breathing and Sneezing –
,20 breaths per minute and 20 sneezes per hour
1.07610
27 1.99610
211 0.186
2 (D) Breathing and Sneezing –
,20 breaths per minute and 50 sneezes per hour
2.30610
27 4.94610
211 0.215
Notes:
1Expellant Density Assumed to be Same as Water (998 kg/m
3).
{Air Density Represents a Pressurized Cabin at an Altitude of 7000 Feet (0.81 kg/m
3) [50].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.t002
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nucleic acid amplification. Thus, it is not possible to deduce a
viability coefficient from the results of their study. Note that the
viable fraction in our study is 5-fold lower than the influenza
particle fractions reported by Fabian et al. Given these large
discrepancies and the overall scarcity of relevant data in the
literature, it would be beneficial to conduct experiments using
non-infectious virus (and/or 120 nm polystyrene beads that
exhibit size characteristics comparable to influenza viruses) to
empirically test the number of collectible influenza particles
emitted in a 90-minute interval within a mock aircraft section.
One may notice that the viral particle counts from the
breathing-and-sneezing scenario are quite low relative to those
computed for the breathing-and-coughing and breathing-only
scenarios. This discrepancy is due to the data source employed in
our calculation. Specifically, all sneeze data was based on a single
1946 study by Duguid [35], which did not observe any particles of
,1 micron diameter. In addition, there were fewer breaths per
minute in the breathing-and-sneezing scenario compared to the
breathing-only scenario. It would be beneficial to repeat the
sneeze-related analysis using newer data from sneeze experiments
that used sick persons as subjects.
The study has additional limitations, including the assumption
that there is no longitudinal mixing more than four rows from the
infectious passenger along the length of the airliner cabin. Indeed,
recent experimental evidence suggests that biological particles can
Figure 5. Time History of Contaminant Transport. (a) Contaminant Concentrations in the Airliner Cabin. (b) Contaminant Mass Flow Rate at the
Outlet Vents.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.g005
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[46]. This far-field transmission study was conducted in a wide-
body mock aircraft cabin section under ambient pressure and
representative flight ventilation conditions. The biological particles
were emitted from a handheld mister and may not be entirely
representative of human exhalation. A further limitation of the
present analysis is that detection does not imply infection. Viral
particles are known to degrade quickly (from minutes to hours)
outside host environments [43], bacteria and spores can have
longer survival times (.five weeks) [47]. Infection is additionally
confounded by the host’s immune system; the findings in the
present study do not address infectivity. Collectively, the
limitations imposed by the parameters used in this study were
intended to create the most optimistic case for a biosensor system
that could collect and detect viable bacterial and viral pathogens.
Equally important, but completely omitted in the analyses
presented here, is the PFA, which must be minimized in any
deployed biosensor system. Given the low steady-state particle
concentrations of viral pathogens in cabin air, even in an
optimistic case where seven passengers in a row are actively
exhaling particles, future studies should consider the feasibility of
rapidly detecting infectious particles directly from human
exhalation using hand-portable devices and well-targeted sampling
schemes (e.g., direct sampling of sputum or nasopharyngeal fluid).
Materials and Methods
The Model
The models developed in this work closely follow the work
conducted by Chen et al. [12,16,17,48]. The difference in the
present work is that the source producing the representative-sized
contaminants more closely resembles a passenger breathing and
coughing, breathing and sneezing, or simply regular breathing.
ANSYS CFX commercial software was utilized for the CFD
simulations. The software computes the contaminant transport via
advection and diffusion, as shown in equation 1.
LC
Lt
z~ + +. ~ U UC
  
~~ + +. rDCz
mt
Sct
  
~ + +.
C
r
     
zSC ð1Þ
where
~ U U = velocity (m/s)
C = concentration, mass of contaminant per unit volume of air
(kg/m
3)
r = mixture density, mass per unit volume (kg/m
3)
SC = volumetric source term, contaminant per unit volume of
air per unit time (kg/m
3 s)
DC = kinematic diffusivity (m
2/s)
mt = turbulent viscosity (Pa s)
Sct = turbulent Schmidt number (non-dimensional)
Equation 1 assumes that particles follow airflow streamlines. As
a result, the particles’ velocity is not computed. This method of
modeling is valid when the particle diameter is relatively small and
particle dispersion is not important [49]. The majority of airborne
particles small enough to enter the human respiratory tracts are
less than 20 mm in diameter [42] and are also small enough to
remain suspended in the airflow. According to the Stokes number,
it is reasonable to state that particles less than 75 microns will stay
suspended and follow the lazy particle model [49]. By assuming
that no particle settles onto a surface and all particles stay
suspended and possibly continue to the collector is not entirely
realistic but it is sufficient to prove this paper’s point; that particle
detection with the commercially available biosensors surveyed is
not practical.
The CFD model we employed is representative of the airflow in
a Boeing 767 airliner cabin. A renormalized group kinetic energy-
dissipation (RNG k-e) turbulence model, assuming air as an ideal
gas and reference pressure of 1 atmosphere, was used because of
the model’s reasonable accuracy and low computational cost [16].
The boundary conditions used in these simulations are listed in
Table 3. At the inlet, a mass flow rate of 0.313 kg/s was applied.
This was chosen on the basis of information that the plane’s
environmental control system (ECS) provides 20 cubic feet per
minute (cfm) of air per passenger [50]. We needed to apply a
boundary condition to the outlet; applying a standard ‘‘outlet’’
condition resulted in slower runtime and program warnings due to
the methods the program uses to apply an outlet condition. It
proved more effective to apply an ‘‘opening’’ condition with a
negative pressure to simulate the air being drawn from the cabin
into the outlet vents and recirculation system. The model was
tested using each of the 8’’, 4’’, and 2’’ meshes according to the
settings described in Table 3. Several mesh sizes were considered,
with the 4’’ mesh providing the greatest accuracy in a reasonable
amount of computation time. Due to turbulence and minor
variations in airflow it was difficult to track precise values for single
points or nodes, but viewing the overall velocity profile for each
mesh showed good agreement from trial to trial [3].
Scenario Descriptions
Three types of scenarios were simulated: (1) breathing and
coughing, (2) breathing and sneezing, and (3) simply inhaling
through the nose and exhaling from the mouth. Scenario 1
employed a combination of breathing and coughing where the
simulated infected passenger coughed 20 times per hour and
breathed the remainder of the time at a rate of 20 breaths per
minute. Scenario 2, like scenario 1, employed a combination of
breathing and sneezing where the simulated infected passenger
sneezed four times per hour and again breathed at a rate of 20
times per minute. In scenario 3, the simulated infected passenger
simply breathed 20 times per minute. The amount of air volume
exhaled per expiratory event was set to 0.5 liters per breath, and
3.56 liters per cough or sneeze. The simulated duration of
expiratory events was 3 seconds for each breath, and 1 second for
each cough or sneeze. The particle concentrations, shown in
Table 2, reach steady-state conditions in approximately 12
minutes, which is well within the 90-minute sampling duration
relevant to this study. Two cases were explored within each
scenario described above: an extreme case in which all seven
passengers seated in a row were sick and a case in which only one
seated passenger was sick. Two additional cases (C and D) were
explored for scenario 2 (sneezing and breathing) in which one
seated passenger sneezed 20 and 50 times per hour, respectively.
Using these input conditions, the average amount of fluid (from
saliva) and average air expelled per person during scenarios 1
through 3 are also summarized in Table 3 in columns 4 and 5,
respectively.
Particle Generation Estimates
To estimate the number of particles emitted by mouth from
human exhalations as a function of particle size, we graphically
summarized a few prior studies that measured particle size
distributions (Figure 6): Morawska [33] used a custom-designed,
pre-filtered, carefully humidity-controlled wind tunnel and report-
ed mean particle concentrations based on aerodynamic particle
sizer counts for up to 50 particle diameter ranges between 0.542
and 20 microns (number of subjects [N]=15). Six different
scenarios were tested, including breathing through the nose (b-n-
n), breathing through the nose and exhaling from the mouth (b-n-
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depicts b-n-m and cough, as they were the only two scenarios
relevant to the current work. Loudon and Roberts [51] used an
air-tight box and Millipore filter air sampler and reported per-
cough mean particle counts to be 120, 100, 6.2 and 1.7 for
diameter ranges (mm) 2–5.8, 5.8–11.6, 11.6–17.4, 17.4–20,
respectively (N=3). Papineni and Rosenthal [52] used a
combination of electron microscopy and an optical particle
counter inside a biological safety cabinet and reported per-cough
mean particle counts to be 290, 50, 25, 35, 10, 10 for diameter
ranges (mm) ,0.6, 0.6–0.8, 0.8–1.0, 1.0–1.5, 1.5–2.0, and 2.0–2.5,
respectively (N=5). We concatenated the Loudon and Roberts
and Papineni and Rosenthal particle size distributions and inferred
a total particle count of 647.9 per one cough, of which 410
particles had diameters smaller than 2 mm and 237.9 particles had
diameters between 2 and 20 mm (Figure 6). We then compared the
concatenated particle size distribution with the more recent cough
distribution and elected to use Morawska’s data for particles under
10 microns and Loudon and Roberts’ data for particles between
11.6 and 20 mm. Therefore, the cough analyses presented in this
work are based on data presented by Morawska [33], and Loudon
and Roberts as corrected by Nicas for evaporative losses [32,51].
To arrive at a reasonable total liquid volume exhaled per cough
from particles under 20 microns in diameter, we estimated the
total volume per exhalation by applying equations described by
Nicas [32] using particle size distribution from two of Morawska’s
experimentation scenarios: (i) breathing normally through the nose
and exhaling through the mouth (b-n-m) and (ii) coughing [33].
Briefly, V20 refers to total number of particles in each range of
diameters up to 20 microns, multiplied by the mean particle
volume in each respective range [32], as shown in equation 2.
V20~
X
i
Ni.vi ð2Þ
where Ni represents the number of particles observed in the i
th
diameterrangewithoutassuminganyevaporativelosses,andvi isthe
mean volume of a particle in the corresponding i
th diameter range.
Because we employed data supplied by Morawska, it was necessary
to normalize mean concentration data into units that apply to one
exhalation event. To calculate the number of particles from one
breath, 0.5 liters of air was multiplied to the mean particle
concentration, which assumed complete release of tidal volume
froma typical person [53].Tocalculate the number of particles from
one cough, 3.56 liters of air was multiplied by the mean particle
concentration;the3.56litervaluewasbasedontheforcedexpiratory
volume in one second reported from normal subjects [20].
In this work, we calculated the mean volume of particles in each
corresponding diameter range, based on the minimal (dmin) and
maximal (dmax) diameters within each range, consistent with prior
work. These calculations assume a uniform distribution of particle
diameters within each size range.
Table 3. Aircraft cabin boundary conditions and exhaled air for each scenario.
Total Volume Modeled =26.9 m
3 Temperature (6C) Velocity and Flow Characteristics
Supply Air Velocity 19.3 0.312 m/s
Cabin Wall 24 0 m/s
Passenger Surface 31 0 m/s
Exhaled Air per Passenger for Scenario 1 – Breathing and Coughing 35 1.86610
24 m
3/s
Exhaled Air per Passenger for Scenario 2 – Breathing and Sneezing 35 1.71610
24 m
3/s
Exhaled Air per Passenger for Scenario 3 – Breathing Only 35 1.67610
24 m
3/s
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.t003
Figure 6. Particle Size Distribution from Human Exhalations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.g006
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Unlike prior work, our study did not assume 50% evaporative
loss for diameter ranges for cases where inputs came from the
Morawska dataset. In diameter ranges where Morawska did not
report any particles due to insufficient instrument signal (i.e., .10
microns for the cough scenario), we employed older data from
Loudon and Rosenthal (see two points on Figure 6).
The particular aerodynamic particle sizer employed by the
Morawska study (TSI model 3312A) had counting efficiencies that
deviated from 100%; only a fraction of all the particles that passed
through the sizer were counted. The sizer’s counting efficiency was
(%) 30, 100, and 60, respectively, for particle sizes (mm) 0.5, 0.9,
and 5 [54]. Because up to 50 possible diameter ranges were used to
estimate V20, we elected not to correct for particle counting
inefficiencies as a function of diameter ranges due to the sparseness
of available correction factors.
Based on the methods described in equations 2 and 3, we
estimated a V20 of 1.247610
-8 ml for one breath, and a V20 of
2.04610
-7 ml for one cough. Prior calculations by Nicas [32],
using data from Loudon and Rosenthal, estimated a V20 of 6610
-
8 ml for one cough. We note that if we had not combined the
recent Morawska data with the older Loudon and Rosenthal data,
the V20 for a cough would be 1.88610
-7 ml using only the
Morawska cough data. Since the intent of this work was to
compute the most optimistic case for biosensor detection, this work
was based on concatenated data, which resulted in a higher
volume of expellants per cough event.
To estimate the number of particles exhaled in one sneeze, we
considered Duguid (1946), who used a combination of food dye,
oiled slides, micrometry and three different test chambers to
measure the average number of droplets and droplet-nuclei
generated when subjects sneezed (,10
6 particles), coughed
(,5610
3 particles), and spoke loudly (,250 particles). As shown
in Figure 6, Duguid reported per-sneeze mean particle counts to
be 26610
3, 160610
3, 350610
3, 280610
3, and 97610
3 for
diameter ranges (mm) 1–2, 2–4, 4–8, 8–16, and 16–24,
respectively. In addition, Duguid reported per-cough mean
particle counts to be 50, 290, 970, 1.6610
3, 870 for diameter
ranges (mm) 1–2, 2–4, 4–8, 8–16, and 16–24, respectively (refer to
Figure 6). Since the present study is most interested in particles
under 20 microns, we computed the ratio of total sneezed particles
under 20 microns to total coughed particles under 20 microns by
assuming that the 16–24 microns diameter range is uniformly
distributed across size and therefore only counted 50 percent of the
particles within 16–24 microns to arrive at particle counts within
16–20 micron. Using this logic, we found that a sneeze is a factor
of 258 times larger than a cough in terms of particle counts (i.e.,
ratio of 864,500/3,345). Therefore, to calculate the volume of
expellants from one sneeze, we simply multiplied the mass of one
cough at every diameter range under 20 microns by 258, which
resulted in 5.27610
25ml, while the volume of air released was set
to 3.56 liters. To estimate the mean particle count under 20
microns diameter in a sneeze for the CFD simulation, we assumed
that one sneeze corresponded to approximately 8.645610
5
particles, and that the particle size distribution followed those
reported by Duguid [35], also shown in Figure 6.
In summary, the amounts of fluid expelled during a single
expiratory event based on V20 for breathing, coughing, or sneezing
were1.247610
28ml,2.04610
27ml,and5.27610
25ml,respectively.
Particle Collection Estimates
To compute the total number of particles at steady-state for each
scenario modeled, the steady-state masses were divided by the
weighted sum of the unit masses expelled by the respective expiratory
activities. For the breathing and coughing scenario, the steady-state
mass was divided by the weighted sum of one cough and one breath
based on 12 minutes of sampling, where 12 minutes was the amount
of time for the model to reach a steady-state. Specifically, a passenger
coughing 20 times per hour would on average emit 4 coughs per 12
minutes (20 coughs/hr61h r / 6 0m i n 612 min). The same passenger
breathing 20 times per minute would emit ,96 breaths in the same 12
minutes. The weighted sum of the particle distribution contributions
from breathing and coughing were ,96% and ,4%, respectively.
Therefore, the V20 (described by equations 2 and 3) for one breath was
converted to mass and multiplied by 96%, while the V20 for one cough
was converted to mass and multiplied by 4%. Similarly, for the
breathing and sneezing scenario, the steady-state mass was divided by
the weighted sum of one sneeze and one breath based on 12 minutes
of sampling. For example, a passenger sneezing 4 times per hour
would emit on average 0.8 sneezes in 12 minutes. The same passenger
breathing 20 times per minute would emit just under 98 breaths in 12
minutes. In this model, the weighted contributions from breathing and
sneezing were ,99.2% and ,0.8%, respectively. Thus, the V20 for
one breath was converted to mass and multiplied by 99.2%, while the
V20 for one sneeze was converted to mass and multiplied by 0.8%. For
the breathing-only scenario, the steady-state mass was simply divided
by the mass of a breath as converted from V20.
To estimate the number of collectable biological particles,
collection efficiencies (CE) were gathered from independent wind-
tunnel testing conducted by the U.S. government using a range of
polystyrene latex beads between 0.5 and 8 microns in diameter
[36]. The aerosol collection rate employed by Kesavan et al. (2006)
was 277 liters per minute, which is sufficiently close to 300 liters
per minute. We applied CE from 3 and 0.5 microns beads
corresponding to 0.91 and 0.357 for the bacterial and viral
calculations, respectively.
To estimate the number of viable bacterial and viral particles, we
surveyed the literature and found very few studies that quantified
viability as a function of particles exhaled by size. We therefore
relied on a very old Duguid (1946) study that measured the number
of organisms per ml of saliva as a function of particle size. Duguid
reported that particle diameters ranging from 1–2 to 2–4 microns
corresponded to viability coefficients of 5.9610
25 and 4.7610
24,
respectively. For simplicity, the viability coefficient for particles with
diameters ranging from 1–2 microns was applied to viral particles,
while the viability coefficient for particles with diameters ranging
from 2–4 microns was applied to bacterial particles.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Compilation of cough statistics. Notes: Chronic cough
can include asthma, gastrooesophageal reflux, eosinophilic bron-
chitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and chronic
bronchitis. 1 Italics represent cases where median values are
reported by primary literature. { Study reports cough frequency in
cough seconds per hour. In this table, 1 cough second is assumed
to be the equivalent of one cough. NR denotes not reported.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014520.s001 (0.59 MB TIF)
Acknowledgments
The contents of this document reflect the views of the author and The
MITRE Corporation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the FAA or
the Department of Transportation (DOT). Neither the FAA nor the DOT
makes any warranty or guarantee, expressed or implied, concerning the
Detecting Bio-Contaminants
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 11 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e14520content or accuracy of these views. Approved for Public Release;
Distribution Unlimited. Case Numbers 10-4599, 09-0950, 09-0888, 09-
0890, 08-0656, 08-1668. GMH thanks L. Morawska and G. Johnson for
furnishing raw data on particles concentrations from human exhalations,
and T. Korves for a critical reading of this manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: GMHH. Performed the
experiments: AAD. Analyzed the data: GMHH AAD GCL. Contributed
reagents/materials/analysis tools: GMHH AAD. Wrote the paper:
GMHH.
References
1. Peiris JSM, Guan Y, Yuen KY (2004) Severe acute respiratory syndrome. Nat
Med 10: S88–S97.
2. Saywell T, Fowler G, Crispin S (2003) The cost of SARS: $11 billion and rising.
Dow Jones Far Eastern Economic Review.
3. Hwang GM, DiCarlo A, Teig LJ, Lin G, Harkin M (2009) Detecting infectious
and biological contaminants aboard aircraft – is it feasible? Technologies for
Homeland Security HST ’09 Waltham, MA: IEEE. pp 477–484.
4. Mangili A, Gendreau MA (2005) Transmission of infectious diseases during
commercial air travel. The Lancet 365: 989–996.
5. Perlroth DJ, Glass RJ, Davey VJ, Cannon D, Garber AM, et al. (2010) Health
outcomes and costs of community mitigation strategies for an influenza
pandemic in the United States. Clin Infect Dis 50: 165–174.
6. National Research Council (2006) Committee on Assessment of Security Technol-
ogies for Transportation. Defending the U.S. air transportation system against
chemical and biological threats. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press.
7. Singh A, Hosni MH, Horstman RH (2002) Numerical simulation of airflow in an
aircraft cabin section. ASHRAE Transactions: Symposia AC-02-17-3: 1005–1013.
8. Aboosaidi F, Warfield MJ, Choudhury D (1991) Computational fluid dynamics
applications in airplane cabin ventilation system design. Proceedings Society of
Automotive Engineers. pp 249–258.
9. Mizuno T, Warfield MJ (1992) Development of three-dimensional thermal
airflow analysis computer program and verification test. ASHRAE Transactions:
Symposia BA-92-2-5: 329–338.
10. Garner RP, Wong KL, Ericson SC, Baker AJ, Orzechowski JA, et al. (2004) CFD
validation for contaminant transport in aircraft cabin ventilation flow fields. US
Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration DOT/FAA/
AM-04/7, Office of Aerospace Medicine. Washington, DC, 20591: 1–6.
11. Lin CH, Wu TT, Horstman RH, Lebbin PA, Hosni MH, et al. (2006) Comparison
of large eddy simulation predictions with particle image velocimetry data for the
airflow in a generic cabin model. HVAC&R Research Special Issue 12: 935–951.
12. Mazumdar S, Chen Q (2008) Influence of cabin conditions on placement and
response of contaminant detection sensors in a commercial aircraft. J Environ
Monit 10: 71–81.
13. Sun Y, Zhang Y, Wang A, Topmiller JL, Bennet JS (2005) Experimental
characterization of airflows in aircraft cabins, Part I: Experimental system and
measurement procedure. ASHRAE Transactions: Research. pp 45–52.
14. Zhang Z, Chen Q (2006) Experimental measurements and numerical
simulations of particle transport and distribution in ventilated rooms. Atmos
Environ. pp 3396–3408.
15. Zhang Z, Chen Q (2007) Comparison of the Eulerian and Lagrangian methods
for predicting particle transport in enclosed spaces. Atmos Environ. pp
5236–5248.
16. Zhang Z, Zhang W, Zhai Z, Chen Q (2007) Evaluation of various turbulence
models in predicting airflow and turbulence in enclosed environments by CFD:
Part 2: comparison with experimental data from literature. HVAC&R Research
13: 871–886.
17. Zhang Z, Chen X, Mazumdar S, Zhang T, Chen Q (2009) Experimental and
numerical investigation of airflow and contaminant transport in an airliner cabin
mockup. Build Environ 44: 85–94.
18. Mo H, Hosni MH, BW J (2003) Application of particle image velocimetry for the
measurement of the airflow characteristics in an aircraft cabin. ASHRAE
Transactions: Research. pp 101–110.
19. Zhang T, Chen Q, Lin C-H (2007) Optimal sensor placement for airborne
contaminant detection in an aircraft cabin. HVAC & R Research 13: 683–696.
20. Hsu JY, Stone RA, Logan-Sinclair RB, Worsdell M, Busst CM, et al. (1994)
Coughing frequency in patients with persistent cough: assessment using a 24
hour ambulatory recorder. Eur Respir J 7: 1246–1253.
21. Li AM, Lex C, Zacharasiewicz A, Wong E, Erin E, et al. (2003) Cough
frequency in children with stable asthma: correlation with lung function, exhaled
nitric oxide, and sputum eosinophil count. Thorax 58: 974–978.
22. Coyle M, Keenan D, Henderson L, Watkins M, Haumann B, et al. (2005)
Evaluation of an ambulatory system for the quantification of cough frequency in
patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Cough 1: 3.
23. Loudon RG, Brown LC (1967) Cough frequency in patients with respiratory
disease. Am Rev Respir Dis 96: 1137–1143.
24. Smith J, Owen E, Earis J, Woodcock A (2006) Cough in COPD: correlation of
objective monitoring with cough challenge and subjective assessments. Chest
130: 379–385.
25. Birring SS, Fleming T, Matos S, Raj AA, Evans DH, et al. (2008) The Leicester
Cough Monitor: preliminary validation of an automated cough detection system
in chronic cough. Eur Respir J 31: 1013–1018.
26. Decalmer SC, Webster D, Kelsall AA, McGuinness K, Woodcock AA, et al. (2007)
Chronic cough: how do cough reflex sensitivity and subjective assessments correlate
with objective cough counts during ambulatory monitoring? Thorax 62: 329–334.
27. Matos S, Birring SS, Pavord ID, Evans DH (2007) An automated system for 24-
h monitoring of cough frequency: the leicester cough monitor. IEEE Trans
Biomed Eng 54: 1472–1479.
28. Smith J, Earis JE, Woodcock AA (2006) Establishing a gold standard for manual
cough counting: video versus digital audio recordings. Cough 2: 1–6.
29. Smith J, Owen E, Jones A, Dodd M, Webb A, et al. (2006) Objective
measurement of cough during pulmonary exacerbations in adults with cystic
fibrosis. Thorax 61: 425–429.
30. Key A, Holt K, Hamilton A, Smith J, Earis J (2010) Objective cough frequency
in Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis. Cough 6: 4.
31. Zihlif N, Paraskakis E, Lex C, Van de Pohl L-A, Bush A (2005) Correlation
between cough frequency and airway inflammation in children with primary
ciliary dyskinesia. Pediatric Pulmonology 39: 551–557.
32. Nicas M, Nazaroff WW, Hubbard A (2005) Toward understanding the risk of
secondary airborne infection: emission of respirable pathogens. J Occup Environ
Hyg 2: 143–154.
33. Morawska L, Johnson GR, Ristovski ZD, Hargreaves M, Mengersen K, et al.
(2009) Size distribution and sites of origin of droplets expelled from the human
respiratory tract during expiratory activities. J Aerosol Sci 40: 256–269.
34. Baker AJ, Erickson SC, Orzechowski JA, Wong KL, Garber RP (2006)
Validation for CFD prediction of mass transport in an aircraft passenger cabin.
ADA465914. Oklahoma City: Civil Aeromedical Inst.
35. Duguid J (1946) The size and the duration of air-carriage of respiratory droplets
and droplet-nuclei. The Journal of Hygiene 44: 471–479.
36. Kesavan JS (2006) Characteristics and sampling efficiencies of Omni 3000
aerosol samplers. ECBC-TN-028. Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center.
37. Emanuel PA, Fruchey IR (2007) Biological Detectors Market Survey. Aberdeen
Proving Ground: Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.
38. Fa b i a nP ,M cD e v it tJ J ,De H aa nW H ,Fu n gRO P ,C o w l i n gB J ,eta l .( 2 00 8 )I n f l u en z a
virus in human exhaled breath: An observational study. PLoS ONE 3: e2691.
39. Papenburg J, Baz M, Hamelin ME `, Rhe ´aume C, Carbonneau J, et al. (2010)
Household transmission of the 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza virus:
Elevated laboratory confirmed secondary attack rates and evidence of
asymptomatic infections. Clin Infect Dis 51: 1033–1041.
40. Suess T, Buchholz U, Dupke S, Grunow R, an der Heiden M, et al. (2010)
Shedding and transmission of novel influenza virus A/H1N1 infection in
households—Germany, 2009. Am J Epidemiol 171: 1157–1164.
41. Tandale B, Pawar S, Gurav Y, Chadha M, Koratkar S, et al. (2010)
Seroepidemiology of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus infections in
Pune, India. BMC Infect Dis 10: 255.
42. Roy CJ, Milton DK (2004) Airborne transmission of communicable infection -
the elusive pathway. N Engl J Med 350: 1710–1712.
43. WeberT,StilianakisN(2008) Inactivation ofinfluenzaAvirusesintheenvironment
and modes of transmission: A critical review. Journal of Infection 57: 361–373.
44. Tellier R (2006) Review of aerosol transmission of influenza A virus. Emerg
Infect Dis 12: 1657–1662.
45. Bischoff W, Wallis M, Tucker B, Reboussin B, Pfaller M, et al. (2006)
"Gesundheit!" sneezing, common colds, allergies, and Staphylococcus aureus
dispersion. J Infect Dis 194: 1119–1126.
46. Gerencher C (2010) Research on the transmission of disease in airports and on
aircraft. Advanced models for predicting contaminants and infectious disease
virus transport in the airliner cabin environment. Washington DC: Transpor-
tation Research Board of the National Academies. pp 28–33.
47. Otta J, French G (2009) Survival of nosocomial bacteria and spores on surfaces
and inactivation by hydrogen peroxide vapor. J Clin Microbiol 1: 205–207.
48. Zhai Z, Zhang Z, Zhang W, Chen Q (2007) Evaluation of various turbulence
models in predicting airflow and turbulence in enclosed environments by CFD:
Part-1: summary of prevalent turbulence models. HVAC&R Research 13:
853–870.
49. Liu X, Zhai Z (2007) Identification of appropriate CFD models for simulating
aerosol particle and droplet indoor transport. Indoor Built Environ 16: 322–330.
50. Hunt EH, Space DR (1994) The airplane cabin environment: issues pertaining
to flight attendant comfort, international in-flight service management
organization conference, Montreal, Canada. 1 p.
51. Loudon RG, Roberts RM (1967) Droplet expulsion from the respiratory tract.
Am Rev Respir Dis 95: 435–442.
52. Papineni RS, Rosenthal FS (1997) The size distribution of droplets in the
exhaled breath of healthy human subjects. J Aerosol Med 10: 105–116.
53. Staub NC (1991) Basic Respiratory Physiology. New York, NY: Churchill
Livingstone, Inc.
54. Armendariz A, Leith D (2002) Concentration measurements and counting
efficiency for the aerodynamic particle sizer 3320. Aerosol Sciences 33: 133–148.
Detecting Bio-Contaminants
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 12 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e14520